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M.B.: I wanted to start with your review for Theoretical Criminology of Arrigo et al.’s volume 
The Ethics of Total Confinement: A Critique of Madness, citizenship, and Social Justice, in 
particular the following line: “But how then do we treat those who have violated the 
established order and are sent away to the penitentiary?  Are these same individuals part of 
the all that justice seeks to embrace?”  In Arrigo’s case, he invokes the complex 
circumstances of juveniles, the mentally ill, and the sex offender.  You respond with the 
critique that the foundations of criminal justice and a more therapeutic or virtuous system 
of justice are inseparable from what it is to be human and live in society.  As you put it in 
your Jan. 3 email, “how is it possible to create or evoke this very necessary condition of 
human flourishing in the criminal justice system when it is not present in the free society…”? 
I’d like to use those questions and problems to frame a preliminary discussion of 
criminology and the ethical - what I see as generally absent and avoided theoretical 
exploration in criminology in need of address but also quite simply unacknowledged 
foundations of the field.  In other words, these questions, although rarely addressed, are 
THE questions.  Not to be too presumptuous, I’d like to playfully problematize what it means 
to do whatever it is we do. 
For you, me, and others who take up a critical criminology, it seems there is a 
question of ethics at the heart of the project of criminology.  Although ethics is something 
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that criminologists teach regularly and invoke often enough in research, it is a concept that 
is rarely theorized in relation to its foundational role in the formation of the social and its 
failures – which for me is the very site of criminology.  Interestingly, criminologists have not 
been my primary influences in coming to this conclusion. Instead I’ve spent a good deal of 
time over the past two years with a political philosopher who has greatly informed my work: 
Emmanuel Levinas.  
For Levinas, as you and I have briefly discussed, being human means that we stand 
accused fundamentally and this accusation/claim occurs prior to anything else.  It derives 
from an encounter with the face of the other (before we even encounter the other) - read: 
absolute vulnerability, weakness, fragility, dependency, and need.  It is a relationship that is 
original (primordial?) and unequal and demands an obligation, a responsibility we will never, 
can never fulfill. Levinas visualizes this relationship (although certainly the scope of the face 
exceeds identity) through the problem of misery, abandonment, and destitution - the weak, 
the poor, the orphan, the widow poised before the one who is richer, more 
powerful.  Asymmetry then is fundamental.  This is a situation made more complex by the 
fact that in any and every face-to-face encounter, multiple claims are present - multiple 
needs, multiple degrees of vulnerability, all relative, against an all-encompassing and 
singular vulnerability that is what it is to be human.  So what is to be made of this claim 
and of that responsibility?  What are the moments in which the encounter produces 
something genuinely extraordinary within the ordinary: Here, I'm thinking of the scene from 
Grossman's Life and Fate - the act of extraordinary generosity: the Russian woman who 
gives her last piece of bread to the German Nazi, now a prisoner of war and shoveling dead 
bodies out of a camp, whom she might just as soon kill, whom she must, on some level, 
despise - an act without explanation - the "epiphany of the face of the other." 
If we are to take these responsibilities seriously as criminologists and human beings, 
then we are positioned well beyond the realm of law, crime, and criminal justice.  We are 
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caught, as are ALL, squirming in the midst of irreconcilable relations and forced to 
deliberate, deny, do nothing, do something – and whatever we do, we will never fulfill this 
responsibility.  Here, we run up against the dark side of empathy: It is fully possible to put 
one’s self in the shoes of another and look away, avoid, deny, “not know” even as we know 
(as Stanley Cohen writes (2001), exploit, manipulate, and murder the targets of our 
empathy.  Understanding another’s suffering is no prohibition against suffering; in fact, this 
is most likely the empathy baseline.  However, that is an open-ended moment, one in which 
myriad possibilities, knowable and unknowable, occur.  It is this predicament – and this 
responsibility (whatever we make of it) that makes existence social and gives our lives a 
direction toward action and, sometimes, praxis.  Responsibility is the “secret of sociality,” as 
one of my favorite Levinasian commentators, philosopher Michael Morgan, claims (p. 
177).  The regularity and generality of laws and institutions, like criminal justice, preclude 
us from seeing that originary point for these rules, practices, policies, etc., are because we 
have been called upon to respond to another person in one way or another. 
For Levinas, the law is the reminder of this framing of relations.  Of course, for 
someone like Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben (another major influence), we 
will only see transformation when we move beyond the law. 
This kind of position does not change the human condition, which is a dark one in too 
many ways, but it does have, minimally, the possibility of serendipitous acts of generosity – 
of a will to life and not death, that is far too little marked and remarked upon in 
criminology.  Such reorderings also remind us that, as scholars and actors, we are not 
simply about crime and punishment but something much more fundamental.  
DP: For me there simply is no disagreement or equivocation concerning your opening point: 
ethics is indeed at the heart of criminological and forensic psychotherapeutic practice, it is 
at the heart of what it means to be human and it is the call that seeks to shake us from our 
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lingering and sometimes immutable bad faith or totality.  To recognize the flaws of the 
social order is to be willing and able to reconfigure the conversation concerning crime and 
criminological practice, which in turn, would evoke or perhaps even require that a different 
set of questions be asked.  Within the safe confines of the classroom setting or the shared 
collegiality of academic publishing, these questions are rarely offered and when they are 
raised, their impact offers little resistance to what they say about the criminal or the ethical 
responsibility of the social order that is always implicit in criminal justice practice. 
 The notion of failure, I believe, is an important aspect of this narrative, but is one 
that all too often is hopelessly skewed toward the individual perpetrator who is required to 
take exclusive responsibility for the specific criminal act.  Though it would be illogical and 
perhaps even irresponsible to conclude that the individual is not in some way implicated in 
the social harm evoked by their specific actions, it seems equally as irresponsible to contend 
that the social context from which these behaviors emerge is somehow insignificant or not 
in any way complicit in the production of the criminal act.  Quinney (2000) in addressing 
this very concern makes the following observation. 
      What is important in the study of crime is everything that happens before the  
               crime occurs.  The question of what precedes crime is far more significant to our 
               understanding than the act of crime itself.  Crime is the reflection of something 
               larger and deeper.   (p. 21) 
 
However, I am unconvinced that this observation alone resolves or actually even is 
capable of addressing the problem, which you raise.  It could be argued that Quinney’s 
observation, though ideologically at odds with those who maintain an unflinching and 
uncritical fidelity toward the belief that the act of criminality is the sole responsibility of the 
perpetrator, still seems to evoke a more causal or dialectical compatibility with these other 
seemingly incongruous theoretical perspectives.  Whether ensconced within a totality of the 
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individual or within a deep structural analysis of cultural or social forces, crime production 
remains epiphenomenal to either the manifestation of individual irresponsibility and 
personal failure or as a product of failed economic and political structures within society, to 
which the individual falls victim.  If we are truly to understand the act of criminality as 
Quinney instructs, our theories must reflect the ability to incorporate the co-constituted 
intervolvement of individual agency and social processes of construction and production.   
 Such a necessity, I think, is recognized by your observation that we must reach 
beyond the specific practices of academic criminology, criminal justice and its various 
practical applications, to embrace what it actually means to be human; this is a much more 
difficult project to embrace, but is an inescapable challenge that must be endured (Romano, 
2009).  To be accused is to face the implications of this threat, which calls us to recognize 
the other as a separate possibility for what it means to be human; a possibility that is not 
contingent upon any other totalizing process or image.  Criminal justice practice is 
particularly vulnerable to this type of totalizing social production, which seeks to construct 
the image of the offender in very specific and potentially self-serving ways that tragically 
results in the proliferation of unjust practices in the name of justice (Arrigo, Bersot, Sellers, 
2011). 
 The failure here is more directly situated within causal or dialectical explanations or 
descriptions of crime or criminal behavior, which refuse to transcend the more traditional 
linear presentation and conceptualization of this problem.  Add to this distinction, the way in 
which human being itself comes to be constructed or defined as that which is worthy of 
ethical consideration that which is not (Derantly, 2008).  The act of criminality not only 
becomes the totalizing “signifier” for that which is in some way less than human, but as 
such, is therefore deemed unworthy of any ethical consideration or empathetic reflection.  
The theoretical dualities of lawful/ criminal, human/inhuman, or normal/abnormal become 
aspects of a type of Totality within the ethical phenomenology of Levinas, which are never 
truly able to recognize the presence of this other accept as that which my totalizing 
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presence is unable to own for itself.  I think the following observation by Levinas 
(1961/1969) is appropriate:  
      
    To have the idea of Infinity it is necessary to exist as separated. This separation 
              cannot be produced as only echoing the transcendence of Infinity, for then the  
    separation would be maintained within a correlation that would restore totality   
    and render transcendence itself, the overflowing of an adequate idea.  If totality  
    cannot be constituted it is because Infinity does not permit itself to be    
    integrated.  It is not the insufficiency of the I that prevents totalization, but the  
    Infinity of the Other.  (pp. 79-80) 
 
Levinas (1961/1969) continues by stating 
 
    Reflection can, to be sure, become aware of this face to face, but the “unnatural” 
             position of reflection is not an accident in the life of consciousness.  It involves a 
             calling into question of oneself, a critical attitude which is itself produced in the  
             face of the other and under his authority.  (p. 82) 
  
The face of the criminal and victim is always absent.  Not the face constructed by 
criminological theorizing or methodological reduction, but the truly all too human face of the 
individual that emerges in the space of our shared human failure.  I think that our inability 
to call ourselves into question, to endure the ethical call that the other evokes is the very 
process that allows for the asymmetry that you identify.  It also may help to lessen the 
need for the complete separation that Levinas requires insofar as the Infinity of the other 
also helps to reflect that which is Infinite in me: not an overflowing of an (in)adequate idea 
but the overcoming of its failure.   
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MB: Part of what I like about your response is the idea that we cannot get to a discussion of 
crime production as long as “failure” is perceived through the lens of the individual.  More 
significantly, it seems we still do not have a recognizable vocabulary or legitimate discourse 
of the “social” against classical and neoliberal frames.  Many criminologists conceive of this 
individualism as a problem of negative emotions, of a drive toward retribution as a vaguely 
disguised vengeance.  However, I am increasingly more concerned with the problem of 
prosocial behavior – of a perceived benevolence – in relation to these issues.  Scenes of 
vulnerability, the kind that lie at the heart of the criminological enterprise, are perhaps 
more likely to produce desires to withhold attachment – to be irritated by the scene of 
suffering in some way of both victims and perpetrators – in a manner that leads to an 
aversion of complex sources of pain.  This may occur, even as, actors choose sides and 
celebrate themselves as having caught the feelings of suffering of others (including those 
who fall along the vectors of race, class, gender, age, and ability or dis-ability).  Empathy 
that prides itself on its own authenticity and good will may invoke, as the law often does, 
what Lauren Berlant calls a “cruel optimism,” “ a relation of attachment to compromised 
conditions of possibility whose realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer 
fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (p. 94).  Among the many positions that these critiques 
take, one includes the notion that “the directional quality of empathy offends because an 
empathizer feels with a subject who may or may not be empowered to speak for herself, to 
correct misconceptions about her feelings, and to refuse the pitying gaze.  Finally, the 
threat that empathy justifies and precedes the imposition of ‘improving’ programs that may 
or may not benefit the recipient or respond to a real need also makes it suspect” (Keen, 
location 2733, Kindle Edition).  These, of course, are the perennial problems of reformation 
in criminal justice. 
Furthermore, add to this your claim that it is the very act of criminality that stands 
in, as totalizing signifier, for all that is in any way less than human.  Here, criminology gains 
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a mandate that is virtually infinite in its calling.  In late modernity, we have a proliferation 
of identities that are constructed as “less than human” or, relying upon political philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben, “bare life.”  If we follow Agamben’s lead and imagine this as a figure 
outside the law (the actor stripped of fundamental rights to shelter, food, financial, and 
social support) and yet situated through ethical dependency upon the state, cast into a 
desperate struggle for survival with no responsibility upon the sovereign state to aid in that 
survival, then we run up against what an alternative mandate in criminology might mean: 
to address the question that haunts us all anyways: As Agamben puts it, “Are there human 
lives that have so lost the quality of legal good that their very existence no longer has any 
value, either for the person leading such a life or for society?" (Kindle Locations 1539-
1542). 
Interestingly and importantly, Agamben posits the boundaries of bare life as a 
moving threshold, one where we each risk the possibility of finding ourselves.  In this widely 
cited passage, he makes dramatic connections between the life lived beyond the law and 
the manner in which every society marks this limit. 
The new juridical category of "life devoid of value" (or "life unworthy of being lived") 
corresponds exactly-even if in an apparently different direction-to the bare life of 
homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is 
as if every valorization and every "politicization" of life (which, after all, is implicit in 
the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new 
decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, 
becomes only "sacred life," and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every 
society sets this limit; every society-even the most modern-decides who its "sacred 
men" will be. It is even possible that this limit, on which the politicization and the 
exceptio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing 
but extend itself in the history of the West and has now-in the new biopolitical 
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horizon of states with national sovereignty-moved inside every human life and every 
citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It 
now dwells in the biological body of every living being. (Kindle Locations 1559-
1566). 
This threshold is a critical boundary I would argue for criminology.  It is a line that 
predicated upon the boundaries of citizenship/state identity associations and those who 
have lost those markers: the stranger, the foreigner, the immigrant, the refugee, the 
undocumented, the asylum seeker, and the disappeared.  It also marks the boundaries of 
the most basic materials of social support against those caught in zones of chronic crisis 
amid the cracks of social structure (the poor, the orphan, the mentally ill, the widowed, the 
homeless, the dislocated, the list goes on and on – all categories of social vulnerability).  
And then, finally, we have those posited beyond the pale (the criminal, the prisoner, the 
condemned) those posited beyond life, those where the biological and social converge along 
the line of life and death (the chronically or terminally ill, mentally ill, the disabled).  Part of 
the story of criminology has to be how these categories have proliferated across modernity 
with greater visibility as we create more complex processes for defining and extending what 
and whom is inside and outside of the configuration of life.  These are of course, to return to 
the idea of a moving threshold, categories into which, amid neoliberal trajectories, 
strategies of austerity, and the emptying of social infrastructure, individual actors may find 
themselves at various points in the life course – thus a potentiality we all carry within (amid 
social risk positions) … to be dislocated, dispossessed, dis-eased, condemned, disappeared. 
In the end, what is NOT the realm of the criminologist?  And what does it mean to do 
criminology?  We study vulnerability and what it is to be human and what it is to miss that 
humanity…as you put it, “the truly all too human face of the individual that emerges in the 
space of our shared human failure” that is too often the very moment of our turning away – 
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“our inability to call ourselves into question, to endure the ethical call that the other 
evokes.”   
For these reasons, I also believe that at the heart of criminology is another kind of 
mandate: one that must guard against the reification of death through apocalyptic 
discourses of abandonment, one that gives attention to those complex local histories and 
sociologies that crisis and exclusion seek to obscure.  In bare life conditions, humans 
consistently find ways to pick up the pieces, the fragments, and live at the site of 
devastation.  And they do this through a complex maneuver that leaves them in interstitial 
zones to which we rarely give attention or agency (the kind of complex agency that is 
extremely constrained and yet palpable – so different from the individualism of dominant 
discourse). Bare life lays bare its perpetual dependency upon the generosity and support of 
others: charity, humanitarian groups, volunteer organizations, friends and acquaintances.  
It betrays the fact that ex-humans are generated through the social institutions – economy, 
education, families, religion - that ex-citizens were all once members of these formations 
until they were expulsed or severed from them. It is, consequently, as any prisoner will tell 
you, the life of radical dependence AND the will to a life that is otherwise.  Resistance 
comes, in these instances, most powerfully through the taking on of the very form of life 
that sovereign power seeks to impose, acts of lip sewing and hunger strikes, fecal 
bombardment and self-mutilation, where the stateless through their very acts assume the 
position of bare life and do so as a means of making an ethical demand upon the citizen. 
Here, in a zone of indeterminacy, a politics of contestation and challenge which works 
within, across, above, and beneath the power of the state serves as constant critical 
pressure upon the state, a pressure of emancipatory intent aiming at its infinite recognition, 
amelioration, democratizing failure.  Perhaps, here, in the counter discourses and hidden 
transcripts, criminology can launch an alternative social justice that seeks neither state or 
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stateless societies, but the narration of the present as a struggle that is always immediate, 
urgent, now. 
DP:  Your reflection offers a number of very powerful observations to which I would like to 
respond. I like very much the way in which you explore the problem of “benevolence “and 
its relationship to the construction of “prosocial values.”  The scenes of vulnerability, to 
which you allude, often nullify the very possibility of empathy, which in turn, reconstructs 
and reifies these vectors of pain. It is impossible to transcend these conditions without the 
explicit recognition of their existence.  The notion of benevolence is particularly implicated in 
this process and calls into question the very legitimacy of this stance.  Berlant’s (2010) 
notion of “cruel optimism” seems analogous to what I would call an arrogant benevolence 
which seeks to impose a certain “moral vision” upon the other that is incongruent to the 
lived reality of that experience.  Empathy that refuses to acknowledge the other person in 
her own right and from the legitimacy of her perspective is not an example of empathy at 
all.  An empathy that “…prides itself on its own authenticity and good will…,” articulates an 
inflated attachment to self that must reduce the presence of the other to that of an 
epiphenomenal artifact solely in the service of self-aggrandizement.  During such events, 
the legitimate voice of the other is never heard, for the simple reason that this process is 
not constructed to listen to the other; rather, its intent is more specifically focused upon 
validation of my good will.  
 Any legitimate possibility for empathy must require that I join this other from the 
perspective of their suffering and attempt to understand the depth of that experience from 
that perspective.  Within this process, the very foundation of my own authenticity is called 
into question insofar as I am willing to endure the implications of this encounter.  The 
stance of cruel optimism or arrogant benevolence rejects this possibility out of hand by its 
blind fidelity to this example of bad faith.  I would agree that the “improvement of 
programming” which is centrally implicated in this process of arrogant benevolence has no 
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real interest in the “reformation” of the individual undergoing rehabilitative interventions, 
and is much more concerned with the validation of its clinical project.  Ward & Maruna 
(2007) make an important observation on this point. 
  The rehabilitation client, after all, is not the real focus of the intervention, 
                 only his or her outward behavior.  In fact, offender rehabilitation may be one 
  of the only forms of treatment in existence that is explicitly intended for the  
 benefit of others (the community) rather than for the person undergoing the  
          counseling itself.  (Ward & Maruna, 2007, p. 17) 
 
 If this statement is an accurate one, we must then be willing to re-examine the 
ethical foundations of this type of quasi-clinical practice, at least as it is most widely 
constructed by the discipline of forensic psychotherapy.  Within this context, the process of 
rehabilitation evokes Foucault’s descriptions of governmentality and apparatus.  Agamben 
(2009) describes Foucault’s concept of apparatus as “...a set of practices, bodies of 
knowledge, measures, and instructions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient—in 
a way that purports to be useful—the behaviors, gestures, and thoughts of human beings” 
(p. 12).  Traditional forensic psychotherapeutic practice, which intends to be useful, does so 
from a technical point of view that seeks to manage concern and control that which it 
purports to assist.  Such a practice does not seek to rehabilitate but to re-fabricate those 
“broken” individuals under its control for the good of society.  It must be remembered that 
the introduction of methadone as a type of “replacement therapy” for opiate addicted 
individuals, was also a practice that sought to control and manage the criminal behaviors 
related to heroin use without actually ceasing the addictive process.  These individuals were 
not given methadone to cease their addiction—methadone is arguably more addictive than 
the heroin it was intended to replace—rather, its purpose was to prevent the possibility of 
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further street crime related to substance use: the streets of our community remain safer 
because the user’s drug is now supplied by the government.   
 It is certainly understandable for someone reading this reflection to state with some 
frustration, “Well what is so wrong with having a safer community?  After all, don’t both 
parties in this interaction ultimately get what they want?  The user gets his fix at a cheaper 
price and street crime goes down.”  Though on the surface this is certainly true, much like it 
is for certain rehabilitative practices, which appear to reduce recidivism to some degree, 
even while the very conditions from which this criminal behavior is forged, remain 
unchanged and seem to garner little concern from the larger society who simply want to go 
about their business without any further reminder of these forgotten others.   
 I believe the above observation reflects your discussion of Agamben’s 
conceptualization of the bare life.”  The “proliferation of identities that are less than 
human…” becomes the result of a type of social production that re-fabricates these formerly 
discarded individuals into something more easily managed or controlled.  If some manner of 
social breakdown occurs, these “defective social objects” are returned to an institution of 
total confinement for their re-fabrication or indefinite storage.  As such, these lives become 
that which have “lost the quality of legal good that their very existence no longer has any 
value…”  (Agamben, Kindle edition, pp. 1539-1542).  They become the artifact of what 
Primo Levy (1989), Hannah Arendt (1992) and Martin Heidegger (2012) separately defined 
as the fabrication of corpses. 
 The concept “the fabrication of corpses” was initially used to describe the process of 
death which took place in the concentration camps during the Holocaust.   Agamben 
(1999”) observes that  
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In Auschwitz, people did not die; rather, corpses were produced. Corpses 
without death, non-humans whose decease is debased into a matter of serial 
production.  And, according to a possible and widespread interpretation, 
precisely this degradation of death constitutes the specific offense of 
Auschwitz, the proper name of its horror.  (p.72) 
Heidegger in his Bremen lectures on technology given in the late 1940’s makes a similar 
observation some forty years earlier: “Do they die? They decease.  They are eliminated.  
They become pieces of the warehouse of the fabrication of corpses.  They are imperceptibly 
liquidated in the extermination camps….  (Agamben, 1999, p. 74).  The concept of the 
fabrication of corpses is a powerful one that also may be applied to a variety of conceptual 
localities other than the horror of the camps. 
 In a much more banal sense, this fabrication of corpses may also be applied to the 
notion of warehousing that is quite familiar to the readers of criminology and in fact, 
represents a type of logical conclusion reflected in the rationale of the penitentiary system. 
Sykes (1958/2007), in his seminal text, The Society of Captives, describes the process each 
individual undergoes upon entering the world of the prison. “His age, name, crime and 
sentence, and other information are duly recorded; his civilian possessions are taken away 
and he puts on the prison uniform” (p. 4).  He continues by observing.  “In a very 
fundamental sense, a man perpetually locked by himself in a cage is no longer a man at all; 
rather, he is a semi-human object, an organism with a number” (Sykes, 2007, p. 6). 
 The semi-human object, this object with a number to which Sykes eludes, is similar 
to the pieces of the warehouse identified by Heidegger.  The warehousing of human beings, 
these lives that “no longer have any value,” become re-fabricated pieces of the assembly 
line of the penitentiary.  Once deemed appropriate for release, they are returned to the 
community to be managed and shaped by rehabilitative practices. As such, they are no 
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longer empowered to speak in their own voice, transformed into a type of “rehabilitative 
corpses” that can only respond with “treatment speak,” never allowed “to correct 
misconceptions about her feelings,...” 
 I would agree that the project of criminology is implicated in almost every aspect of 
life either indirect or direct.  The assumed separation of these localities be they academic, 
professional or existential, become the process by which we help to reify these “discourses 
of abandonment, “ which allow us to turn away and return to our seemingly unaffected 
lives.  In describing Heidegger’s conceptualization of nihilism, Dodd (2009) states that the 
world remains ordered by the very same high values as before except that “It is just that 
the highest values are values that now “devalue themselves” (p. 92).  
MB: There has always been a missing chapter in the story of punishment, one that would 
link the first wave of prison sociologies and ethnographies (Sykes, Clemmer, Goffman), as 
you do, to the fabrication of corpses at the fraught birth of human rights post-Nuremberg, a 
moment that many social-legal scholars now posit as one of the law’s most complex forms 
of failure.  The question: Can mass death and mass incarceration be so far removed? is 
unsettling enough to rightfully push many scholars away.  I have had to remind myself 
across my own field work that the story of the prison, even as it remains among the most 
static and deadliest of human spaces, because it holds life must also carry the promise of a 
continuation of life, a passing of violence and unbearability as well as a sometimes space of 
growth, solidarity, even sociality.  Even so, the tropes and logics of mortification, 
immobilization, paralysis, disintegration, and death extend forward from the birth of the 
penitentiary (Smith, 2009; Rodriguez, 2006) and, furthermore, the mass anonymity of mass 
killing and mass incarceration point to the claims at the heart of Hannah Arendt’s work as 
well, I would argue, as Agamben’s.  (Heidegger is a bit trickier – his “fabrication,” as critics 
have argued, sidesteps accountability, although here is not the place for a complex 
discussion of Nazi ‘sympathy’”.) These kinds of processes and experiences, totalitarian at 
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their core, change concepts of life and death and what it means to be human.  What it 
means to exist in late modernity is to carry the possibility of being subject to mass death 
and mass confinement – and the conditions that drive such forces.  The fabrication of 
corpses – the production of apparatus – depends upon the production of non-stories.   
Counter-narratives in such a space are simply narratives – testimonies, witnesses to 
the life that exists in the space of unbearableness.  But as you have consistently argued, 
there is such an utter resistance to the very kind of complex individuality and agency that 
would defy the anonymity of mass incarceration.  I am reminded of Lorna Rhodes work in 
maximum security settings: Here, Rhodes theorizes individual choice and responsibilization 
strategies among inmates and staff in a manner which not only privileges the “full 
possession of free will,” an essential and necessary maneuver in the rise of the control 
prison, but one which offsets and distracts from fundamental questions about the manner in 
which selves are positioned in relation to one another – in relation to the social.  Prisoners 
are responsible for their crimes, their infractions, their resistance – all of which is carefully, 
complexly constructed as “choice” while the role of prisons, institutions, and the social go 
unmarked.  Rhodes asks: “What are the contexts in which certain ideas about self and self-
responsibility become useful?  What work is done, in the kind of practice that engages this 
man, by regarding himself in such full – not to say murderous – possession of individuality 
and autonomy?” (68).  
DP: Doesn’t mass incarceration become a type of death? Johnson and Tabriz (2011) in their 
article, Sentencing Children to Death by Incarceration: A Deadly Denial of Social 
Responsibility addresses this distinction in the following observation: 
  We cannot execute juveniles, thanks to the Supreme Court, but we  
                     we can lock them up and throw away the key, holding them captive  
  until they die in prison after decades of empty and often debilitating  
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  confinement.  They are dead kids walking, until they grow up and die 
                     as old convicts.   (p. 199). 
  Criminologists, legal scholars, politicians and political activists are often virulent in 
their opposition to the death penalty, but generally are much less so when confronting the 
rapidly increasing use of extremely harsh sentencing practices, which effectively remove the 
individual from the community for decades, if not for the rest of their life. We seem to be 
pleased with ourselves over such results without realizing that our compromise has actually 
achieved very little.   Though it is true enough that we will have achieved the desired 
incapacitation of the offending individual, we have also clearly demonstrated that we have 
no legitimate belief in the process of rehabilitation.  The rendering of such harsh sentences 
can completely invalidate any legitimate possibility for a successful return to society, if 
indeed potential re-entry to society is actually the honest goal of this process.  Johnson and 
Tabriz (2011) add that: 
  Essentially, life without parole is like the death penalty in that it ‘alters the  
offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable’ (Graham v. Florida, 2010, p.  
18), and furthermore ‘gives [the juvenile] no chance for fulfillment outside 
prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope’ (Graham v. 
Florida, 2010, p.28).  The Court in Graham v. Florida (2010) appears to 
concede that life without parole amounts to a civil death penalty, the death of 
the offender’s freedom, an assertion very close to the notion that this is in  
fact our other death penalty.  (p.p. 199-200) 
  The above observation by Johnson and Tabriz seems to reflect the distinction you 
also offer between the death penalty and mass incarceration.   These similar reflections 
concerning the degree of ethical separation between mass death and mass incarceration 
also seems to evoke certain aspects of Agamben’s (1998, 1999; de la Durantaye, 2009, 
Norris, 2000, 2005) philosophical argument concerning his conceptualization of the camps 
as a type of current political paradigm.  He describes the concept of paradigms as a 
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possibility that is neither a particular nor a universal, but both. In describing what he calls 
the historical object, Agamben states that:  
I believe that history—or better, what Foucault called the archaeology of one’s 
own culture—is the only way to reach the present. The historical object is 
never only in the past and never only in the present.  It lies in a constellation 
formed by both.  (de la Durantaye, 2009, 243) 
Taken from this point of reference, the camps become the paradigm for mass incarceration 
and those who are forced to endure this type of existence. 
 It is important to clarify that such a comparison is not historically literal, nor is it 
intended to be.  The historical and irrefutable horror and tragedy of the German 
extermination camps is not lessened or devalued when used as an example for the current 
practice of mass incarceration.   Some have taken great exception with Agamben’s 
conceptualization of the camps, which for them seems to detract from the unique reality of 
this unparalleled historic event, arguing that it does indeed lessen the unique historical 
significance of the camps and cheapen the catastrophic loss of life. (Fackenheim, 1982; 
Marion, 2006;    However, even the most cursory reflection on the history of the last fifty 
years would seem to challenge the uniqueness of this type of human behavior.  It seems 
ethically problematic and perhaps even shortsighted to enclose the meaning of the camps 
within a specific historical moment that becomes forever separated from those events that 
came before and those events that tragically followed.   
The hardest aspect of this lesson lies in the idea that the same freedom—the 
same potentiality that is man’s essence—that made such horrors possible is 
also the only one that can help us understand and combat those horrors.  For 
this reason, in the catastrophe to which Agamben is directing his reader’s 
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attention there is contained a fragile truth about the nature of being human 
that, in his view, could all too easily slip through history’s hands. 
(de la Durantaye, 2009, p. 285) 
The observation provided by de la Durantaye allows us to return to your initial observation 
concerning the ethical significance of mass incarceration.  
 Though it is certainly true that one could immediately raise a variety of objections to 
the comparison being proposed here, such as: extermination camps are not the same as the 
incarceration of law breakers or that life imprisonment is not the same as a death sentence, 
for the simple reason that no life is specifically taken in this type of incarceration, no one is 
actually executed by the state.  It could also be argued with perhaps more difficulty that 
unlike the extermination camps, no one is being incarcerated based on the fact of their 
ethnicity or religious orientation.  It is also equally possible that we allow ourselves to be 
manipulated by the lack of literal continuity between these examples, thereby allowing 
history to once slip through our hands, and another type of social catastrophe to occur.     
 If as the Majority of the Supreme Court has opined in Graham v. Florida (2010) that 
life without parole becomes a type of civil death penalty than it does seem appropriate to 
explore the use of this type of sentencing with the experience of the camps, even if these 
two points of comparison are not literal representations.  The sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole becomes a type of death given that the inmate’s life “…is no 
longer his own, and in that sense he is a living dead man” (Norris, 2000, p. 50).   Though 
this individual will not have to undergo the actual ritual of state execution, the sentence of 
life without parole becomes a type of legal practice that provides for a bloodless killing that 
is much neater and much less prone to ethical objection.  Justice Thomas (2010) argues as 
much in his strongly worded minority opinion offered in Graham v. Florida by stating:  
The Court does not conclude that life without parole itself is cruel and unusual 
punishment.  It instead rejects the judgment of those legislatures, judges and 
juries regarding what the Court describes as the  “moral question of whether 
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this sentence [life without parole] can ever be “proportionate” when applied 
to the category of offenders at issue here [juvenile offenders].    
(Graham v. Florida, Dissenting opinion, p. 1) 
Thomas (2010) continues to argue that the national consensus concerning these types of 
sentences rejects the assumption that incarcerating a juvenile for life without possibility of 
parole is cruel and unusual punishment and is therefore both ethical and just; this shameful 
reality leads me to reflect on your observation concerning the penitentiary. 
 As you clearly state, the penitentiary also holds life and “…must also carry the 
promise of a continuation of life, a passing of violence and unbearability as well as a 
sometimes (potential) space of growth, solidarity, even sociality”.  Your observation, which 
juxtaposes the experience of violence with the experience of growth and solidarity, 
exemplifies for me Agamben’s reformulation of Foucault’s notion of apparatus.   
Agamben makes the following distinction concern his re-formulation of Foucault’s concept of 
apparatus.  
  I wish to propose to you nothing less than a general and massive portioning 
 of beings into two large groups or classes: on the one, living beings (or  
substances), and on the other, apparatuses in which living beings are 
incessantly captured.  (Agamben, 2009, p. 13) 
However, Agamben continues with a third category which he identifies as subjects.  “I call a 
subject that which results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight 
between living beings and apparatuses” (Agamben, 2009, p. 14). 
 From this context, the incarcerated individual attempts to find ways by which to 
overcome the violent environment of the penitentiary. The apparatus of the penitentiary 
literally captures living beings who are incessantly caught by this process.  The semi-human 
object discussed by Sykes (1958/2007)  in The Society of Captives or the dead men walking 
described by Johnson and Tabriz become examples or potentialities from which this subject 
may emerge.  The incessant struggle between living being and apparatuses to which 
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Agamben elides becomes the ground from which escape becomes possible (Leder, 2004, 
Leigey, 2010). 
Leder (2004) in his article, Imprisoned Bodies: The Life-World of the Incarcerated 
describes the ways in which this struggle is actually experienced.  Leder, who worked for a 
few years as a volunteer teaching philosophy in a Maryland Maximum security penitentiary 
explored this incessant struggle with the individuals in his class.   Though the specifics 
varied from person to person, all were clearly situated within this struggle of the subject 
that Agamben describes.  Whether it was returning to the past or imagining a future or 
confronting head on the de-humanizing experience of incarcerated life, each individual was 
able to find a space where this subject is possible.   
The descriptions that these individuals offered to Leder are similar to those that were 
told to me by those serving time in the Pennsylvania system.  For these individuals, the 
constant struggle seemed to focus on the various ways one could be this subject, one could 
escape the incessant capture of the apparatuses of penitentiary life.  Whether it was in the 
privacy of one’s cell or in small groups or within the shared space of a classroom setting, 
escape became possible.  Perhaps this incessant struggle is best captured in the following 
observation by Agamben where he discusses the subject and the remnant. ‘…the subject is 
a sort of remnant… It is something that is left over—it represents a difference.  It is the 
impossibility for a subject to completely coincide with itself; there always remains a 
remnant’ (de la Durantaye, 2009, p. 300).  
 
MB: David, you write “Our inability to call ourselves into question, to endure the ethical call 
that the other evokes is the very process that allows the asymmetry that you identify to 
exist.”  I would argue this claim is the key to death discourse in relationship to criminology, 
a cultural blind spot that is carefully sustained by conditions of avoidance, aversion, and 
punitiveness that sustain structures of lethal violence.  Agamben’s inevitably problematic 
and yet, I agree, perhaps indispensable invocation of the camps emphatically brings home 
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the starkness of this relationship.  In response to his critics, he has been careful to point 
less to the camps themselves in their unquestionable sociohistorical uniqueness and more to 
the political technologies at the heart of the enterprise of “concentration” and “death.”  
When he writes, “The camp is a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become 
indistinguishable” (p. 170), he points to what allows for a state of exception at the 
foundations of governance – and, with the camps, “the most absolute biopolitical space 
every to be realized” (p. 171).  As he puts it, then there must be a turn away from the more 
superficial questions about the possibility of the holocaust toward the daily configuration of 
lethal and “legal” violence: 
 
The correct question to pose concerning the horrors committed in the camps is, 
therefore, not the hypocritical one of how crimes of such atrocity could be committed 
against human beings.  It would be more honest and, above all, more useful to 
investigate carefully the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which 
human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that 
no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime (p. 171). 
 
What such a paradigm allows for is a manner in which to link the practices of mass 
incarceration, indefinite detention, forced migration, and refugee confinement as “the 
hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living” (p. 175).  In these spaces and, as 
you write, in the “relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses,” we have built 
harsh maps of sociality – unnecessary and pain-filled.  Remnants.  The question from here I 
would argue becomes how to make remnants – and imprisonment - the opening to 
discourse, and not overlooked and naturalized sites of foreclosure.   
As a means of address and in closing, I wanted to point briefly to the role of 
mourning as an alternative discourse.  Contemporary feminists have made consistent claims 
for recognition of life through a politics of mourning.  Judith Butler’s most recent work, post-
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9/11, has been dedicated to an elaboration by way of Arendt, Foucault, Levinas and 
Agamben as to what constitutes “grievable” life.  In earlier work, she points to the unique 
place of Antigone in such debates – the liminal figure caught between family and state, 
between life and death – where to mourn is a crime.  To grieve publicly and openly for the 
banished, for the criminal, is the most subversive and disruptive of individual acts in this 
mythology because it is a grief for all – for the banished, dead brother, for the arrogant 
father, for the brother left alive, for the unspeakable grief of women in her position.  Butler, 
like Agamben, argues that we live increasingly in spaces and times where “populations 
without full citizenship exist within states; their ontological status as legal subjects . . . 
suspended.  These are not lives that are being genocidally destroyed but neither are they 
being entered into the life of the legitimate community in which standards of recognition 
permit for an attainment of humanness” (p. 81).  These categories proliferate – and they 
potentially include any one of us, should our material needs and legal identities suddenly 
shift from the realm of the living to social death, from citizen to non-citizen.  She writes of 
this predicament through the figure of Antigone by asking how one can grieve from within 
the subject position of criminality – from within “the presumption that one’s acts (or one’s 
existence) are invariably and fatally criminal?” (p. 79 – italics mine), the realm of bare life 
where one may be killed without the commission of a crime.  Butler’s answer only leads us 
part-way toward any kind of response but her answer depends upon action.  What does 
Antigone do: “She acts, she speaks, she becomes one for whom the speech act is a fatal 
crime, but this fatality exceeds her life and enters the discourse of intelligibility as its own 
promising fatality, the social form of its aberrant, unprecedented future” (p. 82).  Fatalism 
aside for the moment, this figure of “the unspeakable” nevertheless makes itself heard 
through “borrowing and exploiting the very terms that are meant to enforce its silence” 
(78).   
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The figure of Antigone as witness provides a kind of foundational myth that explores 
the conditions under which conscience may find a voice.  What is the nature of the zone that 
Antigone occupies? A limit – the point at which death is engaged with life – a vacillating 
zone from which the unspeakable truth about the criminal nature of the law might be 
spoken.  In the realm of eternal forgetfulness and of unbearable truths too terrible to behold 
(the criminality of the social order itself?), this is the site where we must perennially find 
our voice and struggle to inhabit the world again and again.   In this way, mourning is 
profound political work.  To mourn, Derrida argues, is dangerous, inescapable, and 
impossible (2001) because, against futility, mourning highlights what is absent, silent, no 
longer seen.  As Toni Morrison writes in “Unspeakable Things Unspoken,” “We can agree, I 
think, that invisible things are not necessarily ‘not-there’; that a void may be empty, but is 
not a vacuum.  In additions, certain absences are so stressed, so ornate, so planned, they 
call attention to themselves; arrest us with intentionality and purpose, like neighborhoods 
that are defined by the population held away from them” (p. 11).  Anthropologist Michael 
Taussig similarly argues that “the space of death is important in the creation of meaning 
and consciousness, nowhere more so than in societies where torture is endemic and where 
the culture of terror flourishes.  We may think of the space of death as a threshold that 
allows for illumination as well as extinction” (1987: p. 4).  The tiers of the US prison system 
and its death rows are sites with similar kinds of stakes in life and death.  
I feel as if the way forward is tenuous.  Criminology and criminologists – and 
especially those of us who center our work not simply in the study of prisons, control, and 
theory but in the interrogation and intervention of these spaces and frames – must continue 
to reach with depth and breadth into any way of thinking that pushes, challenges, and 
enlarges that pursuit, that illuminates the “incessant struggle” and inevitable remnants of 
“imprisoned life-worlds” – including considerations of bare life, concentration camps, the 
fabrication of corpses, and all other discourses of social suffering and social death.   
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